During this trip, I’ve largely been caught up with translation and logistics, but in the many hours of discussions we’ve had with growers, hatcheries, scientists and grower representatives, I’ve also been trying to draw some conclusions about the way in which the Australian industry should respond and what the short-term priorities should be. In this post, I’ll try to outline some of my thoughts.
Husbandry
In France, as in Australia, there are a limited range of husbandry changes that can be considered to attempt to minimise the impacts of the virus. My understanding of Australian oyster culture is not extensive, but from what I’ve picked up, these include:
- Growing oysters in different depths
- In inter-tidal culture, this influences the period in which they are exposed to the air
- In other systems (floating or deep-water) depth may have other effects, such as limiting exposure to weather (rumbling due to waves), to UV light, temperature effects and possibly virus load
- Stocking oysters at different densities
- Density should be considered with local effects (number of oysters per bag/tray etc), and at a larger scale (number of bags/trays per hectare in a growing area).
- Equipment used
- We’ve seen a pretty wide variety of growing techniques, including bags, baskets, long line, floating, fixed racks, strings, lanterns etc.
- Timing
- Spat can be stocked at different times, so that they are bigger or smaller, older or younger, at times of peak risk (when water temperature is higher). This can be further extrapolated to the age/size of spat that are stocked.
- Transfers
- Stock can be moved between different areas to influence growth rates or to avoid or delay exposure to heavy virus loads and warmer water temperature.
- Selection of spat
- Diploid, triploid, wild-caught or hatchery. For hatchery stock, there is also a choice of hatchery, each of which may be using different approaches and producing spat of different quality
- Grading and handling
- Mechanical graders, hand grading, no grading, and no doubt a whole range of other details of management involving handling / cleaning / processing the oysters.
- Management of survivors
- Oysters that have been previously exposed to the virus but have not died may be treated in different ways:
- some may consider that they have been weakened by the virus and are more susceptible to dying with any later challenge
- others think that they represent a population with some immunity
- yet others think that they are likely to be carriers and therefore risk spreading the disease
There are certainly a large number of other husbandry activities and issues that I have missed, but these are the main ones that have been discussed during our trip. During discussions with both the producers and the scientists, we have heard a range of opinions and conclusions about how each of these factors affect the level of mortality experienced due to OsHV-1 µVar.
There has been a distinct lack of consistency in opinion about the effect most of these factors have on mortalities due to the virus. This could mean that:
- The effects are different in different locations / environments
- There are other more important factors influencing survival that we are not yet aware of
- The factors being considered have little impact on survival, and observed differences are just random variation
- Desperate farmers are clutching at straws, hoping that different ideas may work, but with little support or proof (we have heard of a range of different ideas that sound rather improbable but which some farmers are keen to implement without any evidence that they may actually help).
Despite this there have been a couple of issues that have been a bit more consistent and merit careful consideration.
Temperature
One of the few things that people are pretty confident of is the effect of temperature on triggering the mortalities. If the virus is present, rising temperature triggers the onset of disease. The threshold at which mortalities start to appear varies a little bit, which is what one would expect if a range of other factors are also involved (e.g. other sources of stress, other opportunistic pathogens such as vibrio, age, resistance etc). Most people we have spoken to suggest that the threshold in most of France is around 17° C. IFREMER has also suggested that there is an upper temperature limit to the mortalities, around 24° C, but no similar comments have been made by producers and it is not certain what the practical importance of this would be in France. It may be relevant in Australia, however.
In some parts of France, farmers with multiple leases in different areas take advantage of this temperature effect. Some small areas have lower temperatures than surrounding areas and oysters may be transferred here to avoid the wave of mortalities that accompanies increasing water temperature. In Australia, there is a significant range of water temperatures between different oyster growing areas, but restrictions on interstate movements mean that the opportunities to exploit this type of approach will be rather more limited.
Growth rate
We have regularly heard that rapidly growing oysters are more susceptible. The exact mechanism for this has not been described with any consistency. It may be simply because rapidly dividing cells provide a better opportunity for the virus to replicate itself. Others point to physiological stress in rapidly growing oysters, and others suggest that shell strength plays a role.
A number of strategies appear to have developed in response to the hypothesis of the importance of growth rate, involving speeding up or slowing down growth off different classes of oysters at strategic times.
Age/size
The early observations in France have been that young oysters are more susceptible. This still appears to be the case in most areas, to the point that farmers on the Atlantic coast seem to feel that adults are not at significant risk. They were surprised by the observations from Australia and New Zealand that older oysters also suffered very high mortality rates. In contrast, in the Mediterranean (and possibly some other areas), adults appear to suffer heavy losses. Based on the hypothesis that genetic resistance is the main determinant of survival, some farmers prefer to have their spat heavily challenged and suffer high levels of mortality, so that the survivors have a lower chance of dying as adults. Losing adults after all the effort of growing them clearly has a very demoralising effect.
What is not clear is the interaction between age, size and growth rate. Definitions of adult and juvenile are generally based on size, but may describe oysters of very different ages, depending on the region of origin. Significant differences in nutrient levels and growth rates , and therefore age/size relationships, are likely to be evident in Australia as well.
Viral load
Another relatively consistent message was the importance of viral load. It appears that oysters exposed to the virus may well continue to carry the virus, even if it is not detectable with PCR tests. It is not known if they excrete the virus in this subclinical state.
One suggestion (that has apparently been patented in the Mediterranean) is to grow mussels between the rows of oysters, based on the theory that they may act as a barrier to the movement of virus, or ‘soak up’ virus from the environment without being affected. There is little information available about the effectiveness of this approach, but one IFREMER study showed that the mortality of oysters grown in a range of different environments (surrounded by mussels, other adults, or spat) were very similar, suggesting that it may not be effective.
On the other hand, the importance of viral load in the environment was demonstrated by an experiment in which spat that tested negative on PCR were grown in a previously unused area that was separated from existing (heavily contaminated) oyster growing areas by land and hydrological barriers, and suffered no mortalities despite having suitable water temperatures. This indicates that it is possible to avoid the disease by using a clean environment and spat that are either free or have infection which is undetectable by PCR.
Spread of the disease
The most effective way of spreading the virus over long distances is within live oysters. Outside the oyster spread is probably limited. Some IFREMER work has indicated that it may be able to spread in the water with currents over about one kilometre (although this is likely to vary significantly in different circumstances). This explains the spread of the disease in infected estuaries. The potential risk of spread on contaminated equipment is uncertain – it is probably less effective than moving live oysters, but still may represent a real risk given the right conditions.
In France, it appears most likely that the virus was spread to virtually all growing areas rapidly in 2007 or 2008 through the extremely high number and transfers. As a result, almost the entire coast was affected before the disease was properly understood. Australia is in a much better position, because a) we know something about the disease so we can be ready for it, b) we have managed to identify it in a localised area and respond, and c) the level of transfers is lower than in France. The three oyster-growing states are relatively separate in terms of movements, with only spat moving between states.
The role of hatcheries in the spread of the disease has been hotly debated in France, and the question is still unclear. Hatcheries claim to be able to produce PCR test negative spat (even if the broodstock have been previously exposed). Also, it is possible to explain the rapid spread of the disease throughout the country without the hatcheries being involved – the transfers of wild-caught spat and of growing oysters between sites can easily account for this.
Long-distance spread of the disease is harder to understand. The question of how it got to Australia and New Zealand has still not been answered, and it is not even clear where it came from (some of the French assumed that they were the source, but this is not at all certain). There is little evidence in either direction, but one hypothesis for the long-distance mode of spread is in infected shellfish on the hulls of shipping. This mechanism seems feasible given the common levels of fouling, the high levels of international shipping, and the fact that the first occurrence in Australia seems to have been in Botany Bay (one of the busiest shipping ports). The disease was probably present in New Zealand for some time before it was confirmed, but its distribution suggests that it is possible that it first arrived with shipping to Aukland.
Information on the origin of the virus and the way that it has spread around the globe may be gleaned from genetic analysis and a comparison of the small genetic differences between viruses in different parts of the world. Initial analysis (using only a small part of the genome), indicated that the viruses from New Zealand, Australia and France were all very closely related, and all quite distinct from the classical herpes virus. However more recent work by IFREMER indicates that there may be greater genetic variation in the μ-var than initially thought. As this work progresses, it may provide a better idea of the ‘family history’ of the virus, and better clues as to how it has spread around the world.
The implications for Australia regarding the way the virus can spread are two-fold:
- Transfers are the best way of spreading the virus. If we want to be serious about prevent the spread we need to ensure that we understand current transfer patterns and are able to stop or change them as required.
- If shipping is a potentially important mechanism for long distance spread, we should identify other parts of Australia that may be at risk of becoming infected through shipping, either from overseas, or from the George’s and Parramatta Rivers, and improve our early detection and response capabilities.
In both these examples, the aim is to be ahead of the game and predict the behaviour of the virus, rather than chasing to catch up (often after it is too late). One possible tool to help with this (particularly for transfers) is spatial network analysis (which I’ll mention again later on).
Breeding programs
There was general agreement amongst the Australian team, and many of the people spoken to in France (with a few exceptions), that breeding programs to select genetically resistant stock represented an important medium- to long-term approach to successfully living with the virus. Reports of the initial success of the Australian program were generally met with interest. The Australian team worked hard to understand the different activities and initiatives in France. These include a number of breeding programs undertaken by private hatcheries, either alone or in a consortium, the use of stock developed under an earlier breeding program as part of the ‘Morest’ (Summer Mortality) research program, and a new publicly funded breeding program (‘SCORE’). This latter program aims to produce enough distinct resistant family lines to ensure continuing genetic variability (the danger of in-breeding was mentioned frequently). The objective is to have 100 resistant lines to achieve this. Using an estimate of the frequency of resistant genes in the population of 5%, the initial number of lines to be used will be about 2000. This enormous program aims to produce results rapidly – initially to produce triploids to immediately address the mortality problems, and then later for the release of diploids into the wild, to increase the prevalence of resistant genes in wild-caught spat.
There is also interest in introducing genetics from Japan (one group already came but the program stopped with the Japanese tsunami), and from South America, although there is some uncertainty as to the logical justification for this.
Given the heavy viral load in infected areas, the challenge when selecting for resistance is very heavy. If (as is likely), resistance is not absolute, but on a sliding scale, it is likely that some ‘relatively’ resistant oysters tested under heavily contaminated conditions may fail to survive. However an entire population of the same oysters may prosper due to the lower levels of contamination. This issue may need to be kept in mind when testing family lines in Australia – survival may be better if large numbers of similarly resistant oysters are stocked together, rather than mixed closely with non-resistant strains. This concept is known as herd immunity, and is seen in human vaccination programs – when most people are vaccinated, the pressure put on the less immune individuals is much less because there is little circulating virus. However when very few people are vaccinated, the challenge may be great enough to cause disease even in those that are vaccinated.
Priorities for Australia
In simple terms, I think Australia’s priorities in dealing with the disease are:
- Know where the virus currently is and where it isn’t
- This was the objective of the national survey
- Stop the virus from spreading
- Banning transfers and movement of equipment out of the George’s and Parramatta Rivers aims to do this. If there are other spread mechanisms (such as shipping or local spread in the water), these measures may not completely prevent spread.
- Detect it as quickly as possible if it does spread to a new area
- There are possible weaknesses in our current capacity for this. If the virus spreads during a period when there is no disease expression, we may not know about it. This is discussed further below.
- Limit the risk of further spread in the absence of clinical disease
- Risk-based pre-emptive disease management
- Be ready for the disease if/when it does appear
- Contingency planning and learning how to live with the disease (this was a large part of what the current study tour was about).
- Know what the options are for maintaining commercial production in an infected area. The most successful operators in France have done this by a combination of massively increasing stocking (to compensate for mortalities), and diversification into other species. These options may not be available to all Australian producers.
Testing
There are currently two main tests to detect the virus:
- Clinical observation of high mortalities
- This is relatively sensitive when the water temperature and other conditions are right – it appears that when the virus is there under the right conditions, lots of oysters will die, and it will be easy to detect (good sensitivity).
- The problems are:
- There are many other diseases that may cause mortality. Therefore the specificity of mortality as a test for OsHV-1 μ-var is not very good.
- When the conditions are not right (cooler water temperatures) oysters will not die, even if the virus is present. This means that the sensitivity is not always good.
- The PCR test
- This tests for small fragments of the viral DNA. Tests currently used either test for oyster herpes viruses in general, or specifically for the μ-var.
- The PCR test can detect very small amounts of DNA. This means that an actively infected oyster will normally give a positive test result. However, the test will also be positive if there are just fragments of DNA an no active virus. This means that a positive test result doesn’t necessarily mean that there is active infection. Dead virus may have been filtered in the water and just present in the gut, without causing disease.
- There is also a question about whether the virus can ‘hide’ in the DNA of the oyster, waiting for the right conditions to reactivate. If this occurs, it could be that the PCR test is negative, even though the oyster could later become clinically diseased and spread the virus. It is not clear whether this is a real or just hypothetical risk.
Other tests exist (histology, in-situ hybridisation, electron microscopy, etc), but these two are the main ones for practical routine use. The conclusion about the tests is that when there is clinical disease, they are pretty good, but when there is no clinical disease (when the conditions are not right for the virus), they are not much use. This has major implications for the surveillance program, and for testing efficiency.
Testing healthy oysters (in the absence of reports of mortality nearby) may not be at all efficient. If they are infected, the viral load may be too low to detect, or the virus may be dormant and undetectable – which means that a negative result can be completely trusted. On the other hand, a positive test result is useful – it shows evidence that the virus is present in some form or other in the environment, but it doesn’t prove that this oyster is currently actively infected.
There was considerable discussion within the group and with scientists that we met about how to overcome the problem of detecting the virus outside the period when the environment is suitable for disease expression. One proposal (that I think is worth investigating closely) involves placing apparently healthy oysters (from cooler water) in tanks and warming the water. There should be a rise of at least 5°C over a few days (temperature shock), and the final temperature should be over 17°C. This approach has been used by IFREMER. Their findings are that unaffected oysters continue to be healthy, but infected oysters express the virus and often die. If necessary, PCR can then be used to confirm the presence of the virus (which is now actively replicating and easy to detect).
The appeal of this approach is that
- It should be relatively inexpensive. Putting oysters in a tank for a few days doesn’t cost much. Virtually all testing in Australia is currently negative, so it would be anticipated that very few oysters would show signs of disease or die using this approach, which means that very few would need the much more expensive PCR test to confirm the presence of the virus.
- It is much more sensitive than just using PCR during the cooler period. This would allow useful surveillance to be carried out all year, allowing detection of the spread of disease to new areas before it causes a problem.
This approach should be explored under Australian conditions to confirm that it achieves better sensitivity and specificity than the PCR alone, and can be implemented at lower cost.
Surveillance
Surveillance can be done for a number of purposes. With the current Australian situation, the first objective was to determine the geographic distribution of the virus. This has already been achieved. The next objective is early detection of spread from the known infected areas.
Surveillance for early detection requires that much of the population is examined frequently. If you are only examining a small part of the population, the disease could get into the part that you aren’t looking at, and you have failed to detect it. If you don’t examine the population frequently, then your detection isn’t early.
The most practical way to test a large proportion of the population is farmer observation of clinical signs. Farmers are looking at their oysters relatively frequently, and if larger numbers die, it is pretty easy to detect. Clinical surveillance is therefore the best routine tool for early detection, when the disease will reliably show clear clinical signs (i.e. during summer). When mortality is detected, obviously this should be followed up with confirmatory testing with PCR to check that the virus is responsible.
However this approach doesn’t work during the cooler period. One option is to only do surveillance in summer, but it is possible that the disease could spread (e.g. with ships), be present and quietly spreading for months, before it is detected when the weather warms up. This would be a failure of early detection. The other option would be to take representative samples of oysters from every bay several times over winter and test them (using the method described above). This is a huge amount of work and would be quite expensive (even if it is cheaper than doing PCR on all the samples).
I suspect a compromise approach may be required. Frequent sampling from all areas may be possible, but it would probably be better to focus available resources on those areas that are at the highest risk. If the disease is going to spread, and if we understand the main mechanisms of spread, we probably have a pretty good idea of where it is likely to spread to first. It would be logical to focus our surveillance effort on these areas.
I would propose three different approaches to identifying risk areas for risk-based surveillance, covering the three different mechanisms of spread:
1) Local spread through the water
- Areas close to currently infected areas are clearly at higher risk. For early detection of spread though the water (and by using local feral pacific oyster populations as stepping stones), I would suggest focusing surveillance on feral populations along the coast south of Botany Bay, and north of Sydney Harbour. During the summer, volunteer observers may be able to check for mortality on a weekly basis on each of the headlands in these areas (particularly between North Head and Barrenjoey). At other times, monthly samples could be taken from key populations, and tested using the warmed tank approach.
This approach should be able to provide early warning on the movement of the disease up or down the coast towards farmed populations.
2) Spread via shipping
- Feral populations around areas of heavy shipping activity could be monitored in the same way – frequent clinical observations for mortality during summer and sampling and warming during the rest of the year. Preference should be given in the three oyster producing states to ports with lots of shipping traffic, but in particular to those receiving many ships from Botany Bay or Sydney Harbour.
3) Spread via transfers
- As there are no transfers out of the currently known infected areas, spread by direct transfer of live oysters from the Georges River is extremely unlikely. However, if the disease got into other areas (either by local spread, shipping, or another unidentified pathway), there is a large risk that it could be further spread to other areas by transfers before it is identified, especially if the infection took place outside summer.
An area that only has transfers out but no transfers in would be at very low risk of receiving the disease, but at high risk of spreading it. In contrast, an area receiving oysters from many different locations but none going out would have a high risk of receiving it, but little risk of spreading it.
Spatial network analysis is a tool that could be used to analyse oyster transfers between bays, and identify those locations that have the highest risk of getting infected, and those that have a high risk of spreading the infection. Based on this type of analysis, it is possible to:
- design surveillance systems to focus on those areas with the highest risk, and
- identify which transfers represent the greatest danger to the industry, and seek approaches to minimising the risk by changing transfer patterns (without banning transfers or causing unnecessary disruption).
Surveillance data
For cost-effective early detection, clinical surveillance (detection and reporting of mortalities) is an important tool. To target surveillance (as well as to rapidly respond to the spread of disease) an accurate understanding of transfer patterns is required. Current systems in Australia for reporting of mortalities and collecting data about transfers are not adequate to effectively protect against and respond to the threat of OsHV-1.
The group discussed approaches to addressing these issues. At the OsHV-1 workshop in Cairns earlier this year, I put forward a proposal for a system to capture and use this type of data. Without going into too much detail (this post is already much too long), the principles of the system are that it should:
- Be industry owned and controlled
- Capture multiple types of relevant information that benefits the industry
- Reports of mortalities
- Data on transfers
- Other data of shared interest to the industry (Production? Toxins?)
- Aim to be comprehensive
- E.g. capture reports on all mortalities (even if they can be explained).
- Be confidential with strict controls on who has access to what data
- Be on-line with real-time reporting and analysis
- Be simple to use and not require transcription or double handling of data
- One option is simple SMS reports that go straight into the database
- Have automated analysis and alerts
Risk analysis and preparedness
It is important that the industry develop contingency or response plans before anything happens. My experience is with veterinary emergency response plans like AUSVETPLAN which contain valuable information about the technical response to a disease emergency. In discussion with the team, it became clear that a response plan needs to be significantly broader and include information on
- possible regulatory response options
- financial options available at the individual farm level and at an industry level including sources of assistance during the recovery phase
- social and other sources of support for producers coping with this sort of problem
Research priorities
This is my personal list of some of the research needs for the Australian industry, in approximate order of priority. Further research issues have been raised in the previous discussions.
- Management options for decreasing mortality
- Researching the relationship between depth, density, growth rate, age and size
- Cheaper, more practical tests for surveillance
- Testing the approach of warming oysters to trigger disease rather than using PCR on healthy oysters
- Development of effective clinical surveillance and transfer data capture systems
- These systems will not only help with OsHV-1 but will provide basic infrastructure to help respond to any other disease problem in the future
- Spatial network analysis
- To understand the risk of spread, both with shipping and transfers.
- Role of other species in spreading the disease
- Some of this work is already planned in France
- Development of an experimental model
- This has been done in France, and may be directly applicable to Australia
- Genomic analysis
- To understand the relationship between different strains, where it came from and how it is spreading over long distances
Thanks
Finally, I’d like to say thanks to Bruce, Rob, Tom and James for making the trip such a success and a pleasure, as well as to Cate for her help in organising, translating, driving, entertaining, charming the French and keeping us all in line. Cate and I set a pretty demanding schedule with very few moments for rest, but, despite jetlag and culture shock (and occasional tummy wobbles) the team stood up well and attacked the task with admirable dedication and good humour. I’d also like to thank the Australian industry as a whole and FRDC for the opportunity to be involved.